Why U.S. Diplomacy in Europe Needs Urgent Renewal
A more coordinated and integrated EU-NATO approach is essential to maintaining trans-Atlantic stability.
By GORDON DUGUID | NOVEMBER 16, 2025
The Trump administration’s decision to sanction Russia’s largest oil companies is a welcome show of support for Ukraine. But it doesn’t reflect a strategy so much as irritation with Russian President Vladimir Putin for his refusal to negotiate. Since January, Washington’s wavering approach has often bolstered Moscow more than Kyiv. As the United States signals uncertainty, Europe — through both the European Union and NATO — has become Ukraine’s most consistent source of backing.
That should not surprise anyone who has worked on trans-Atlantic relations. During my 31-year Foreign Service career, I was posted twice to the U.S. Mission to NATO, and I’ve seen the consequences of assuming that Moscow will act in Europe’s interests. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis, some hoped that Russia would reprise its cooperation from the end of the war in Bosnian-Herzegovina four years earlier. Instead, the Kremlin chose to compete with NATO, even sending troops to seize the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, before allied forces could arrive. The lesson then is the lesson now: Russia understands strength, not sentiment.
Today, a stronger, more coordinated EU-NATO approach is not only advisable — it’s increasingly essential.
Although NATO cannot take major action without U.S. approval, Europe has long had the tools to assume more responsibility for its own defense. The groundwork was laid in the 1990s with the European Security and Defense Initiative, which created the option for NATO operations conducted primarily by European allies. In practice, that means Europe can offer Ukraine meaningful security guarantees even if the United States hesitates.
And Europe has the power to act. The EU’s population is about 450 million. Its collective GDP in 2024 was $19.4 trillion — second only to the United States. Its membership includes two nuclear powers, almost 2 million people under arms, and a political system that, whatever its flaws, remains fundamentally stable. These are the elements of a great power. Putin knows this, which is why the Kremlin is working hard to fuel political opposition to Europe’s military buildup.
Britain and France are already discussing options to deploy forces as part of a “coalition of the willing” to help secure Ukraine — an arrangement some have likened to “Article 5 without NATO.” Europe is also leading on armaments and on non-NATO security guarantees for Ukraine. None of these efforts require Washington to disappear. But they do require it to stop vacillating.
Can Europe defend itself without the United States? Yes, but only if it continues to accelerate defense spending and sustain it. Europe must eventually be able to operate without relying so heavily on American assets, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But that is a long-term project.
Can Europe defend itself without NATO? No. NATO was conceived by Europeans to defend Europe — but they needed the United States, because the continent was shattered by World War II. The alliance remains the central vehicle for European security. Its European members and Canada can protect the European heartland, but along NATO’s eastern flank, Russia’s threat is real and immediate. This is why NATO recently launched “Eastern Sentry,” a series of operations aimed at strengthening allied posture against Russian incursions.
If Putin prevails in Ukraine, what follows won’t be peace. The Baltic states and Moldova would likely be next. The Kremlin doesn’t seek accommodation with the EU; it seeks hegemony over Europe’s political future. Having welcomed Russian generals to NATO headquarters during the early years of the NATO-Russia Council, I saw firsthand the Kremlin’s belief that it deserved a de facto veto over alliance decisions. That was never going to happen — so Moscow pursued another path: coercion.
At its core, the conflict between Russia and the West is not about NATO expansion. It’s about the West’s belief that democracy, open markets and human rights underpin stability — and Russia’s belief that those same principles threaten its regime. Putin sees respect for human rights as the key force that helped unravel the Soviet Union. He is determined not to let democratic change come to Russia and is equally determined to prevent it from flourishing on Russia’s borders.
That alone makes Europe’s defense inseparable from U.S. interests.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, some wondered whether NATO had completed its mission. But the alliance quickly realized it had built a political and military structure valuable far beyond its original purpose. America’s commitment to Europe has always rested on four pillars: economic, security, cultural and geopolitical.
If Russia achieved dominance in Europe — as unthinkable as that may seem today — the United States would face a geopolitical adversary controlling the western edge of the Atlantic. Greenland would become a frontier. History teaches that borders between spheres of influence are where wars often begin.
Europe must prepare for more aggressive Russian behavior — now. That means increased defense spending, deeper integration of EU and NATO capabilities and unwavering military support for Ukraine. The surest path to European stability is halting Russian aggression in Ukraine. Once the Kremlin accepts that force cannot achieve its aims, the possibility of a durable peace will grow.
The United States doesn’t need to — and should not — withdraw. U.S. diplomacy and military assistance remain indispensable. But Washington must understand that Europe is no longer a junior partner. It’s a great power whose security interests increasingly require collective action.
The United States should welcome that evolution. It has gained as much as Europe from NATO’s transformation into a dynamic, political and military alliance. Fully engaging in NATO is not charity, but a good strategy. The alliance remains the only venue where the United States and Europe can shape the world together before adversaries shape it for us.
Gordon Duguid, a retired Foreign Service officer, is the Donald F. McHenry visiting professor of diplomacy and international relations at Illinois State University, and the author of “Counter Narrative,” a novel about the work of the Foreign Service.
The views and characterizations in this article belong to the author and don’t necessarily represent those of Illinois State University, the U.S. government or WIDA.