The Intricacies of Diplomatic Negotiations
While other types of negotiations are mostly transactional, negotiating in diplomacy cannot be isolated from the overall relationship with the other party.
Negotiation is the activity most people associate with diplomacy, even if it represents only one part of managing international relations. Just like diplomacy as a whole, diplomatic negotiation — the dealmaking subset of diplomacy — is a form of application of national power by measures short of war. However, if the purpose of a negotiation is to reach agreement with the other side, the purpose of diplomacy is to achieve an end state required by a government’s overall strategy that advances its interests. Success depends in large part on diplomats’ ability to reshape the other side’s perceptions and calculations, so that it does in whole or in part what one wants it to do, because it comes to see that doing so is in its own best interest, as Chas Freeman points out in another chapter of “Diplomatic Tradecraft.”
This is an excerpt from the book “Diplomatic Tradecraft,” published by Cambridge University Press.
We participate in various forms of negotiation throughout our lives. Companies negotiate business deals, trade unions and executives negotiate labor contracts, car-buyers negotiate with dealers, children negotiate curfew times or vacation destinations with their parents, and negotiation is, of course, a regular fixture of marriage. The goal is to persuade the other side to accommodate one’s demands. Many of the fundamentals of these types of negotiation apply to diplomacy as well. Parties participate in them because they believe they have something to gain by bargaining and something to lose in the absence of a negotiated solution. Such absence deprives them of the influence and insights that only face-to-face talks afford. Willingness to negotiate does not necessarily foreshadow concessions.
What makes diplomatic negotiation different is that it takes place between or among nation-states through their representatives, and the stakes are usually higher than those in a domestic context. In addition, while other types of negotiation tend to be mostly transactional, negotiating in diplomacy cannot be isolated from the overall relationship with the other party.
A truly successful diplomatic negotiation is one that not only resolves an immediate problem, but ensures that the state of relations with the other side will serve one’s interests in the long run. That does not mean that ties must necessarily be close or friendly, as long as they are civil and respectful, and the countries can work together in the future. Another feature of negotiation that is essential in diplomacy is its ability to build a basis for empathy. On one hand, it helps to convey one’s own motivations and interests directly, which can reduce misunderstanding, and on the other hand, it provides insight into the other side’s motivations and perceptions.
Diplomatic negotiation should not be viewed as a favor to an adversary, but as an opportunity to gain and exercise leverage, conduct reconnaissance and build or improve personal relationships. It offers the benefit of using and observing body language, as well as a form of communication that facilitates the kind of engagement written messages do not. The failure of a diplomatic negotiation preserves the status quo — or it can result in a protracted impasse, sanctions or other forms of escalating tensions, and even armed conflict. For economic sanctions and other penalties to be effective, the prospect of their removal must be linked to a conducive deal achievable through serious negotiation.
No matter the type of negotiation, in a diplomatic context, you will almost never get everything you want. At least some level of compromise is inevitable in diplomacy, however masterful a negotiator one may be. The biggest challenge career diplomats face on a regular basis is the necessity to get ready for a negotiation in a hurry, especially if their knowledge of the subject is limited or barely existent.
In both bilateral and multilateral negotiations, timing is as important as location is in real estate. If you have previously built a relationship of trust and good rapport with a foreign interlocutor, you will have a better idea when the time is ripe for a negotiation. You have to make sure that your own government is ready as well, which is usually more challenging than it might seem. Being ready does not only mean being willing — it means that the highest levels of government and the preponderant parts of the bureaucracy with a stake in the negotiation have agreed on what it should achieve. The relevant agencies and key players must resolve all their differences in advance. Diplomats must also understand how the domestic politics of their own country have shaped its interests, as they pertain to the upcoming negotiations, and how that might influence the negotiating strategy.
It is crucial that negotiators possess a deep, thorough and sophisticated understanding of their country’s interests. For example, U.S. diplomats about to participate in talks with Japan on the future of the American military bases in the country must understand why the United States has such a large presence there, why it is important to Washington that the arrangement with the Japanese government continue, and how it benefits the American people. On a deeper level, they must also understand the role of the bases in the overall U.S. security strategy and projection of power in the Pacific, as well as existing and potential threats in the region that affect the bases and the troops stationed there. Finally, they have to be aware of the impact the U.S. installations have on the local population and the Japanese public in general, and how it affects their attitudes toward the United States.
If you treat a diplomatic negotiation as a transaction with someone you barely know, you are less likely to get what you want or need. On the other hand, the more you know about the other side and the better rapport and level of trust you have with them, the more likely you are to succeed. You should try to learn everything you can about your interlocutors — and the decision-makers, if they are not part of the negotiating team. That includes where they come from, what defines and shapes them, what their fears and hopes are, who influences them inside and outside their government, how they see their national interests, how they assess threats and opportunities, what they want and need from the negotiation.
It is usually a good idea to meet, or otherwise communicate, with your interlocutors in advance — it is even better if you know each other already. There is little more important in building a rapport and trust than being a good listener. Active listening has three principal objectives: to assess what the other side says, to understand what it means, and to derive — with some luck — what they might settle for. Getting your counterpart to talk may not be easy — like you, they do not want to reveal too much, because that may put them at a disadvantage.
Speaking their language, literally and figuratively, as well as understanding their cultural background, will give you a leg up. People tend to use certain phrases and idiomatic expressions in their native tongue to convey feelings, and the ability to pick up hints can be very beneficial. If your command of that language is at a level that allows you to use such phrases effectively yourself, and especially if you get their sense of humor, you may be able to put them at ease and have relaxed conversations. In all this, you should not be pushy or intrusive, because that will arouse suspicion. Instead, just show curiosity by making clear you want to understand where your interlocutor is coming from.
As one of the most intense parts of diplomacy, negotiations often hinge on personal relationships. You do not have to like your opposite number, but you should show respect for their leadership position in their country and the authority that comes with it. That should not be viewed as a favor to the other side, but as creating a path to achieving your goals. In the 1980s, a breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet arms-control talks did not occur until the second half of the decade, after President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had built as solid a relationship as was possible between the world’s largest adversaries at the time.
Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, already knew Gorbachev fairly well when he became president in 1989, from his time as Reagan’s vice president. Although the United States was at the height of its power after the Berlin Wall fell, while the Soviet leader was struggling to hold his country together, Bush showed Gorbachev a lot of empathy by including him in all major negotiations on Europe’s future, such as the reunification of Germany.
Even before signing an official agreement, it is essential in diplomatic negotiation that everything the sides agree on, as small as it may seem, is written down, so they know where they stand and can move on to other issues, rather than rehash what has already been discussed. Every session should end with a summary of what was accomplished in that time, with or without agreement. When Gorbachev visited Washington in May 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union were at odds on whether the process to reunite Germany should lead to the country’s membership in NATO. At the time, West Germany was a NATO member, while East Germany belonged to the Warsaw Pact, a Soviet-led military alliance. The Soviet Union was opposed to a united Germany in NATO, and even Britain and France were not willing to support the U.S. push for NATO membership.
During a meeting in the Oval Office, Bush said that, according to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which had been signed by all members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), including the Soviet Union, all countries had the right to choose their alliances. So Germany should be able to decide whether it should join NATO, the Warsaw Pact or neither, Bush added. Gorbachev nodded in an apparent agreement. As the conversation moved to another matter, Robert Blackwill, senior director for European affairs on the National Security Council staff, thought that Gorbachev’s consent should not be glossed over. He passed a note to Bush suggesting that he get the Soviet leader to say he agreed that Germany should be able to choose its alliance.
“I’m gratified that you and I seem to agree that nations can choose their own alliances,” Bush reopened the issue, according to an account by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, who served on Blackwill’s staff. Gorbachev replied, “So we will put it this way: The United States and the Soviet Union are in favor of Germany deciding herself in which alliance she would like to participate.” Bush proposed a different phrasing: “The United States is unequivocally advocating Germany’s membership in NATO. However, should Germany prefer to make a different choice, we will respect it.” Gorbachev agreed with this formulation. Now everyone understood what Blackwill had meant — Gorbachev had consented to a united Germany in NATO.
“Many of his aides could not conceal their distress,” Zelikow and Rice wrote in a 1995 book. “There was a palpable feeling — conveyed through expression and body language — among Gorbachev’s advisers of almost physically distancing themselves from their leader’s words.”
It was quite a moment, and a turning point. Thanks to Blackwill, the complete reversal of the Soviet position was part of the official record of the meeting — and just over four months later, Germany reunited as a NATO member.
Thomas R. Pickering is a former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs and former ambassador to Russia, India, Israel, Nigeria, Jordan, El Salvador and the United Nations.
Nicholas Kralev is the founding executive director of the Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA). His other books include “America’s Other Army” and “Diplomats in the Trenches.”
The views and characterizations in this article belong to the authors and don’t necessarily represent those of the U.S. government or WIDA.
The above is an adapted excerpt from the book “Diplomatic Tradecraft,” published with permission from Cambridge University Press. © Nicholas Kralev 2024